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Abstract This paper analyzes the causes of corruption in contemporary
Bolivia. It argues that, along with the well-documented observation that richer
countries tend, on average, to be less corrupt than poorer ones, corruption is
directly dependent on FDI inflows, with higher levels of FDI associated with
lower levels of corruption and vice versa. Additionally, the findings reveal that
a less controlled, more permissive market for coca leaves actually reduces the
level of corruption in the country, supporting the hypothesis that the way to a
less corrupt Bolivia is by lowering government intervention into this contro-
versial market.
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1 Introduction
A significant amount of research has been devoted to studying the consequences and
determinants of corruption,1 particularly in developing countries. High levels of
corruption have been associated with lower rates of economic growth, lower
exposure with international markets, and lower private investment rates. However,
no formal analysis has been done on the effect that foreign investment and the
market for coca leaves have on the level of corruption in individual countries.
In this paper I estimate the impact that FDI inflows and the price of coca leaves
have on the level of corruption in Bolivia. Since both foreign investment and the
market for coca leaves have a significant impact on the economic performance of
this country, quantifying the effect that these variables have on its level of
corruption should aid in directing public policy towards a more realistic and
pragmatic approach. The contribution of this paper is twofold: it highlights the
existence of a causal link between corruption-FDI and corruption-coca, and it shows
that an open, less criminalized coca market does not necessarily have a pervasive
effect on the level of corruption.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and
presents the hypothesized link between the coca market and corruption. Section 3
introduces the data and the empirical model. The methodology is presented in Sect.
4. Section 5 analyzes the results, and Sect. 6 concludes.
2 Corruption, coca, and Foreign Direct Investment
Several studies have shown that certain environments are more conducive to higher
levels of corruption. Rose-Ackerman (1975) and Tanzi (1994) argue that corruption
is associated with the discretionary power of public officials, and hence it can be
contained by scaling down public sector activities that stimulate its growth; Van
Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) show that civil service wages are an important
determinant of corruption, with lower wages associated with higher levels of
corruption; Ades and Di Tella (1999) argue that less competition is likely to
generate greater incentives for corruption; Leite and Weidmann (1999) show that in
countries with an abundance of natural resources, the opportunities for rent-seeking
behavior are greater; Blackburn et al. (2006), analyzing economic development and
bureaucratic corruption in a dynamic, general equilibrium model of growth, find that
corruption and development are negatively related; Alexeev and Habodaszova
1 Throughout this study, corruption refers to corruption within the political system. It results in the
misuse of public power for private benefit, and it manifests itself in extrajudicial payments and bribes to
public officials to obtain—for instance—import and export licenses, compliance certificates, and to avoid
exchange rate controls and tax assessments. It is also at work when public power is utilized to obtain
privileged access to things as varied as police protection and loans. Excessive patronage, nepotism, job
reservations, ‘favor-for-favor’, secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and
business or other special interest groups—such are coca producers—are all examples of types of
behaviors that fall under the definition of corruption. The corruption index utilized here accounts for this
specific form of corruption and the methodology for its construction can be found at http://prsgroup.com/
ICRG_Methodology.aspx.
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(2007) demonstrate that decentralization of responsibilities may decrease the size of
bribes for entrepreneurs depending on the type and quality of public goods offered
by the local government; Toke et al. (2008), studying the role of political
accountability as a determinant of corruption and growth, find that in regimes with
high quality of political institutions, corruption has a substantial negative impact on
growth, while in regimes with low-quality institutions, corruption has no impact
on growth; Toke (2009) argues that while corruption may have little average effect
on the growth rate of GDP per capita, it is a likely source of unsustainable
development. In the same line, Gupta et al. (1998) demonstrate that high and rising
corruption increases income inequality and poverty by reducing economic growth,
the progressivity of the tax system, the level and effectiveness of social spending,
and the formation of human capital, and by perpetuating an unequal distribution of
asset ownership and an unequal access to education; and Meon and Weill (2010),
studying the efficiency of corruption in an otherwise deficient institutional
framework, find that corruption is less detrimental in countries where institutions
are less effective and may even be positively associated with efficiency in countries
where institutions are extremely ineffective.
Additionally, there is a well-established link between the openness of a country
and its level of corruption, with the more open economies being less prone to acts
that would be characterized as corrupt. Krueger (1974), Bhagwati and Srinivasan
(1980), Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000), Wei (2000a), Gerring and Thacker (2005),
and Neeman et al. (2008) are a sample of authors presenting evidence that supports
the notion that countries that are more open to trade and investment are also less
corrupt. Knack and Azfar (2003), however, offer evidence suggesting that for
smaller nations the link between greater integration with world markets and less
corruption may not be as obvious.
Despite substantial empirical work on corruption and its impact in a number of
variables, little has been done on the effect that FDI has on corruption levels in
individual countries, and no systematic work has been done on the effect that the
market of coca leaves has on this variable. As far as I can tell, this is the first time
that corruption is explained in terms of FDI inflows and the workings of the coca
market in a particular country.
2.1 Coca and corruption
Bolivia is the third largest producer of coca leaves in the world. Coca leaves are the
raw material needed for production of cocaine, an illicit drug. A central thesis of this
work is that a direct link exists between the level of corruption in the country and
the price for coca leaves. Before digging deeper into the arguments behind this
proposition, it is interesting to note that the vast majority of the analysis conducted
so far on the influence of coca in Bolivia has tended to focus on the historical
dimension of coca use in the country2 and on the evolution of the so-called ‘War on
2 Representative works of this kind are Hallums (1997), who explores the history of coca production in
Bolivia and recounts the involvement of the country in the cocaine trade, and Le´ons and Sanabria (1997)
who survey the historical and political linkages between coca and cocaine.
Lat Am Econ Rev (2014) 23:11 Page 3 of 23 11
123
Drugs’ that the United States officially instituted during the presidency of Ronald
Reagan back in the 1980s.3 Additionally, most of the work undertaken on the
subject is overwhelmingly descriptive4 and tends to assume that coca production is
synonymous with corruption in producing countries such as Bolivia. While this
assertion might be true, the literature on the subject fails to demonstrate the ways in
which the coca market generates incentives for corruption.
It should be noted, however, that despite the lack of specific studies analyzing the
ways in which the market for a critical input (i.e., coca) for an illegal drug affects
corruption in the producing country, the notion that ‘legalization’ of drugs will
reduce corruption in that country is not new. A number of economists (Thornton
(1991), Dennis (1990), and more recently Miron (2005), to mention a few) have
long advocated for the legalization of drugs as a way to reduce corruption, crime,
violence and a cohort of other negative externalities. Though the scope of the
present study is limited to how coca leaves affect corruption and does not directly
address the issue of legalizing cocaine, it does illustrate that during the period of
analysis a more permissive approach to coca production did lead to less corruption,
as has long been advocated by those who have analyzed similar situations in
different geographic settings. An important contribution of this paper is to register
the experiences of a developing country like Bolivia that produces the key input for
a widely utilized illegal drug and how different policy approaches to this input have
affected corruption in that country.
An initial appraisal of the market for coca leaves in Bolivia is shown on Fig. 1,
where yearly production and average price levels for coca leaves are presented for
the period 1990–2012.5
As is evident from Fig. 1, an inverse relationship between production levels and
the price of coca leaves exists during the period under consideration. Figure 1 also
illustrates that the early part of the 1990s was the period of time of greatest
production of the leaf, with a marked decline in production levels in the latter part of
that century, as government efforts to curtail production—through eradication
policies heavily influenced and financed by the United States—became more
successful.6 The past few years have seen a comeback of sorts, as production of
3 It can be argued that the ‘War on Drugs’ has been fought for over a 100 years, though it was Richard
Nixon, in 1969, who first used this term explicitly. Ronald Reagan, in 1980, escalated Nixon’s rhetoric
into an actual war by passing a series of bills to boost prison terms for consumers and dealers of illegal
drugs and by making several agencies in the US government active participants in the war.
4 Farthing and Kohl (2012) is a clear representative of this line of work.
5 Figures for production levels and price of coca leaves utilized in this work reflect conditions in the
Chapare region, one of two coca producing regions in Bolivia. According to the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), coca leaves from Chapare are not conducive to traditional uses—i.e.,
chewing by mostly indigenous populations—as the leaves are bigger, rancid, and generally unfit for
human consumption. UNODC estimates that most of the coca from Chapare is used in its alternative,
illegal applications. On the other hand, coca leaves in the Yungas regio´n—the other coca producing
regio´n in Bolivia—are believed to be mostly devoted to traditional uses as their chemical composition
seem more amenable for chewing.
6 The key piece of legislation behind eradication efforts by the Bolivian government is Law 1008,
enacted on July 19, 1988, by then president Victor Paz Estenssoro. While it recognizes coca’s traditional
uses, it criminalizes the activities of the leaf in its ‘transformed state’.
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coca leaves has again rebounded, though not near the production levels experienced
during the 1990s.
It is interesting to note that the evolution of coca eradication efforts in Bolivia
reflect the level of commitment of different administrations to this policy. As Mejı´a
and Restrepo (2011) demonstrate for the case of Colombia, government’s efforts to
take that country out of the international cocaine circuit varied as a function of the
incentives embedded in Plan Colombia, much like Plan Dignidad7 in Bolivia,
which also was designed to take Bolivia out of the illegal drug trade. Besides the
divergence in results experienced by both countries with their eradication plans, the
point that must be stressed is that eradication efforts are not constant over time, but
rather change as different governments express different levels of commitment to a
policy of—in the case of Bolivia—forceful eradication of coca leaves. As will be
argued later, the commitment to forceful eradication diminished significantly during
the 2000s, as the governments of the time realized the futility in trying to control
production of a leaf with such deep historical ties to large segments of Bolivian
society, and with such few substitutes in terms of economic returns. A telling
popular account for the change in government commitment to coca eradication
efforts is captured by Steve Boggan8 from the Guardian newspaper, who ponders on
the significance of coca for large segments of the Bolivian population.
The purported link between coca and corruption presented here is fairly
straightforward and is dependent on two key assumptions. First, it is assumed that
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Fig. 1 Yearly production and price coca leaves, Chapare Region, 1990–2012
7 See http://www.clarin.com/diario/2005/12/15/elmundo/i-02501.htm for a description of Plan Dignidad,
instituted in 1998 by President Banzer, which aimed to drastically curtail illegal coca plantations
throughout Bolivia.
8 ‘Coca is a Way of Life’, available at: http://theguardian.com/world/2006/feb/09/features11.g2.
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market. Second, variations in production levels are closely aligned with the political
cycles in the country. With these assumptions in mind, there are four possible
scenarios in which the price of coca leaves and the level of corruption in Bolivia are
intertwined:
A. Due to successful eradication efforts, production levels are reduced, price of
coca increases and corruption levels decrease. This scenario represents the
ideal situation in which eradication achieves its goal without increasing levels
of corruption.
B. Due to successful eradication efforts, production levels are reduced, price of
coca increases, and so do corruption levels in the country. As eradication
policies involve the forceful curtailment of coca plantations, they create
incentives for greater corruption in the form of payoffs—i.e., bribes—to public
officials for crafting erroneous, inaccurate reports, and generally to all actors
within the political system who could benefit from the illegal trade of coca
leaves.
C. Due to unsuccessful eradication efforts, production levels increase, price of
coca decreases, and corruption levels increase. This represents the worst-case
scenario where not only eradication policies fail but also corruption levels
increase.
D. Due to unsuccessful eradication efforts, production levels increase, price of
coca increases, and corruption levels decrease. Here, unsuccessful eradication
policies produce benign negative results in that an out-on-the-surface, less-
regulated, more-permissive market for coca leaves results in less corruption.
A graphical illustration of the evolution of the price of coca leaves and corruption
levels as a share of GDP—both expressed in terms of January 2000 values—during
three key political periods in Bolivia’s recent history is presented in Fig. 2.
The three distinct political periods shown on Fig. 2 are characterized by different
sets of economic and political principles and are arbitrarily referred to in this work
as ‘neoliberal period’, running from the early 1990s to around December 2001; the
‘decomposition period’, which is estimated to have occurred between January 2002
through October 2003; and the current ‘populist period’ which encompasses the
decomposition period and has yet to find a clear ending point. Loosely, the
neoliberal9 period is characterized by market-friendly policies, which, ironically,
ran in parallel with the most inflexible and rigorous eradication policies—reflected
in Plan Dignidad—pursued by democratic governments during this time. The
decomposition term refers to the period of time during which a decentralized,
market-friendly Bolivia began to give way to more government intervention in all
areas of economic life, and the populist term refers to the period of time during
which the country explicitly moved away from a market-led economy towards a
government-led type of economic system.
9 In Bolivia, as in most of Latin America, the term ‘neoliberal’ is only generally associated with the
economic liberalism advocated by classical and neoclassical theories of economics. Its meaning goes
beyond the realm of economics and it is often used in a pejorative manner.
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Successful eradication policies—measured in terms of net reduction in the
amount of cultivated coca leaves—ended with the last neoliberal government in
2001, when Plan Dignidad was for all practical purposes put to rest. Since then, and
as the amount of cultivated coca leaves has consistently increased due to a reduction
in the level of commitment of the new governments to the policy of coca
eradication, the success of this policy has come into question. This paper argues that
since around the end of 2001, but particularly during the years of Evo Morales’
presidency (2006—present), the market for coca leaves has become less controlled,
more permissive to market forces than to government action. This fact is reflected in
production levels, which, according to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,
have increased substantially in the past decade, with an approximately 60 %
increment between 2001 and 2012. Production levels have not, however, reached
the levels of the early and mid 1990s, when Bolivia accounted for about a quarter of
the global production of coca leaves. Demand has also increased considerably
during the same years—also a sign of a less controlled coca market—as the price of
coca leaves has increased by 130 % only between 2006 and 2012.
Despite the greater permissiveness of the coca market during the past decade,
however, Fig. 2 shows that the ratio of corruption to GDP—expressed in 2000
values—declined the most during the 2000s, as the country moved from a market-
friendly economic environment to its current state of greater government
intervention. Understanding the reasons behind this seemingly contradictory pattern
of behavior of corruption is a key objective of this paper.
2.2 FDI inflows and corruption
With respect to FDI, the usual practice has been to analyze how corruption affects
FDI inflows, the exact opposite of what is attempted here. Some authors show that
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Fig. 2 Corruption, coca and political cycles, 1993–2012
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argue—Mauro (1995) is a case in point—that FDI is reduced as the level of
corruption in the host country increases. The latter finding has become particularly
important in the past decades as several governments and multilateral bodies have
enacted laws explicitly outlawing the practice of bribing officials in host countries.10
Hines (1995) demonstrates that ‘US multinationals’ routine engagement in bribery’
changed dramatically in 1977, when the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was
enacted and outlawed the bribing of foreign officials. Wei (2000b), adding further to
the consequences of FCPA, found that US investors are averse to corruption in host
countries, though not necessarily more so than the average OECD investor.
Kaufmann and Wei (1999) find that firms that pay more in bribes are also likely to
spend more—not less—management time with bureaucrats negotiating regulations,
implying that the business community can benefit from laws and collective
initiatives strengthening its ability to say no to bribery. In a similar study, Wei
(1997) concludes that corruption-induced uncertainty is more detrimental to FDI
than taxes.
Despite the effect of anti-bribery laws, several other studies have found that FDI
inflows and corruption levels go hand in hand, particularly in cases where host
countries do not possess appropriate institutional and regulatory frameworks.
Additionally, with large infrastructure projects and privatization programs and when
the size of potential economic rents is considerable, the incentives for corrupt
activities increase. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) offer evidence of a positive
association between corruption levels and the provision of infrastructure; Schleifer
and Vishny (1993) suggest that large-size projects offer more opportunities for
corruption, especially if their value is difficult to monitor; and in a more recent
paper, Egger and Winner (2005), analyzing a sample of 73 developed and less
developed countries during the 1995–1999 period, find a clear and positive
relationship between corruption and FDI, concluding that corruption is indeed a
stimulus for FDI. In these studies, there seems to be a concurrence of factors that
facilitate the emergence of corruption in FDI projects, such are market power of the
industries that attract private investment, discretionary decision-making processes in
host countries, and poorly accountable public officials.
Among the few studies that analyze the effect of FDI inflows on corruption,
Larraı´n and Tavares (2004), considering a cross section of countries, find support
for the hypothesis that FDI as a share of GDP is significantly associated with lower
corruption levels. The study, however, only covers the period 1970–1994, and hence
misses the period of time—1990s and 2000s—during which levels of FDI in Latin
America in general, and in Bolivia in particular, reached record levels. Other
similar, more recent studies are Gueorguiev and Malesky (2012), who find no
association between the prevalence of corruption and FDI inflows in Vietnam, and
10 In the Americas, on March 29, 1996, the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (IACAC) was
adopted by all member countries of the Organization of American States. It came into force on March 6,
1997, and its two main objectives are (i) to promote and strengthen the development by all member
nations of the mechanisms needed to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption; and (ii) promote
cooperation among member states in the enforcement of the Convention’s goals. A similar undertaking
was achieved on a global scale by the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), signed
by most member nations in December 9, 2003, and made effective on December 14, 2005.
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Pinto and Zhu (2009), who find that in authoritarian and poor countries the effect of
FDI on corruption is positive, but turns negative as countries develop and become
more democratic.
In both counts—how FDI inflows and the price of coca leaves affect corruption—
Bolivia seems to be an ideal setting to test the validity of a number of hypotheses.
During the 1990s, the country experienced record-level inflows of FDI into a variety
of economic sectors. FDI inflows diminished and almost dwindled away during the
years of the new century. Conversely, coca leaf production reached record-level
lows during the latter part of the 1990s, but rebounded strongly during the past few
years. Since it is assumed that the price of coca leaves reflects conditions in the
market, testing how the evolution in FDI and the price of coca affected corruption
levels in the country is reasonable.
In summary, and as it concerns the principal objectives of this study, a survey of
the literature yields the following three testable hypotheses:
• H1 (investment climate hypothesis): Foreign Direct Investment inflows and
corruption levels are inversely correlated
• H2 (permissive coca market hypothesis): a less restrictive market for coca leaves
reduces corruption
• H3 (openness hypothesis): trade liberalization tends to reduce corruption
The first hypothesis (H1) draws on the inverse correlation that has been found on
most studies that have analyzed the impact of corruption on FDI, and on those few,
recent studies (Larraı´n and Tavares (2004), and Pinto and Zhu (2009), for instance)
that have analyzed how FDI affects corruption. The specific contribution of this
study is to analyze whether in the case of Bolivia, FDI has contributed to increasing
or decreasing corruption levels. The hypothesis is that it has contributed in lessening
corruption levels in the country.
The second hypothesis (H2) draws on the observations and works of authors such
as Thornton (1991) and Miron (2005), who argue that legalization of drugs would
reduce, among other things, corruption within the political system of countries
affected by the illegal drug trade. Though not explicitly a work on cocaine but rather
on the key input necessary for the production of this drug, this study argues that the
argument for legalizing coca production would also generate less corruption in
Bolivia, and hence the specific contribution of this study is to test whether this
hypothesis holds for a key coca producing country.
A third complementary hypothesis (H3) is to test whether greater openness of the
Bolivian economy has generated less corruption, as most of the empirical evidence
in other countries suggests. With a small economy like Bolivia, the expected inverse
relationship between corruption and openness may not be as evident as in other
more developed economies, but the specific contribution of this paper rests on
analyzing the merits of this hypothesis.
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3 Data and the empirical model
The empirical analysis uses monthly data on corruption levels, real FDI inflows, real
price of coca,11 real total trade on GDP ((exports ? imports)/GDP), and real GDP
per capita during the January 1993 to December 2012 period. The base month for all
variables is January 2000. All data have been obtained from the Statistical Bulletins
of the Central Bank of Bolivia,12 the Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean (CEPAL),13 the data set compiled by Bojanic (2013),14 the
UNODC,15 and the International Country Risk Guide,16 published by the Political
Risk Services Group. Finally, all the data series have been transformed to the
logarithmic form to achieve stationarity in variance.17
The share of corruption on GDP—where corruption18 is measured in accordance
with the International Country Risk Guide indicator (henceforth ICRG)19—is
explained in terms of the share of FDI inflows on GDP, real GDP per capita, the
share of total trade (exports ? imports) on GDP, and the real price of coca leaves.
The three sets of equations include two specifications: the first covering the whole
period (January 1993–December 2012), and the second one comprising the so-
called Neoliberal period (January 1993–December 2001). The specifications
covering the whole period also include a dummy variable (Evo dummy) to account
for the impact of the Evo Morales administration (February 2006–December 2012)
11 Prices refer to US$/Kg of coca leaves recorded in the Chapare region. Prices of coca in the Yungas
region were not reported periodically during the 1990 s. While there are small variations in the price of






17 Though two key variables—corruption and coca production levels—are inherently difficult to
measure, it is important to note that the corruption indicator, as defined in Sect. 1, has been constructed by
an institution (PRS group) that has been collecting this type of information since 1980 and for over 140
countries, which lends credibility to its index. Since the empirical work carried out in this study utilizes
monthly data, an added advantage of this index to corruption indicators from other organizations (e.g.,
World Bank, Freedom House, Transparency International, to mention a few) is its periodicity, since it is
calculated on a monthly basis and not on a yearly basis, as is the case elsewhere. As to data on coca
production, the source of this variable is UNODC, a United Nations department whose sole purpose is to
fight against illicit drugs and international crime through painstaking analysis and collection of data—
utilizing both physical verification and satellite imagery—like the one utilized in this work. Even though
it is true that with both corruption and coca production figures there is a level of uncertainty that can never
be completely overcome, it is also true that there is high degree of confidence in the data for these
variables as they come from reliable sources.
18 The usefulness of the findings reported here should be taken in light of the limitations that corruption
indicators have been shown to have—see, for instance, Donchev and Ujhelyi (2013)—particularly in
developing countries like Bolivia, where corruption levels tend to be relatively higher.
19 ICRG uses a corruption scale that ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values denoting less corruption. In
this paper the ICRG scale has been inverted, hence higher values denote more corruption.
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on the dependent variable. The three sets of equations analyzed are reflected in the
following functions:
sCor ¼ f Ycapita; sFDI; pCocað Þ ð1aÞ
sCor ¼ f Ycapita; sTrade; pCocað Þ ð1bÞ
sCor ¼ f Ycapita; sFDI; sTrade; pCocað Þ ð1cÞ
where sCor = share of corruption on GDP, Ycapita = real GDP per capita, sFDI =
share of FDI inflows on GDP, sTrade = share of total trade (exports ? imports) on
GDP, and pCoca = real price of coca leaves.
Additionally, and to ascertain the robustness of the findings, the three
specifications above are also estimated with two different control variables and
an alternative indicator of trade openness. The two control variables are investment
profile (InvProf), which assesses the risk associated with investing in Bolivia (on a
scale of 0–12, higher values denote higher investment risk) and risk for inflation
(Rinf), which reflects the inflation risk (on a scale of 0–10, higher values denote
higher expected inflation). In a country like Bolivia, prone to substantial monetary
disequilibriums, controlling for both investment risk and inflation risk makes sense.
Following Larraı´n and Tavares (2004), the alternative trade openness indicator is
share of imports on GDP (sImports).20
4 Methodology
Specifications have been estimated with instrumental variables. Preceding regres-
sion analysis, unit root tests were performed to determine the stationarity of all
variables.
Instrumental variables methods allow consistent estimation when the explanatory
variables are correlated with the error term. Such correlation may occur when the
dependent variable causes at least one of the variables21; when there are relevant
variables omitted from the specification; or when these variables are subject to
measurement error. If any of these situations is present, OLS estimates are biased
and inconsistent. However, if an instrument is available, consistent estimates may
still be obtained. An instrument is a variable that meets three basic criteria: it does
not itself belong in the specification; it is correlated with the explanatory variables;
and it is not correlated with the error term.
Formally and based on Bowden and Turkington (1990), consider the following
basic specification:
y ¼ Xb þ e ð2Þ
where y is n 9 1, X is n 9 k, b is k 9 1, and e is n 9 1.
Suppose there is an n 9 j array of variables W, called instruments, that have two
properties: (i) these variables are uncorrelated with the error term in (2); and (ii) the
20 The source for investment profile and risk for inflation is ICRG. The source for all trade data is Bojanic
(2013).
21 Since GDP values are used in both the dependent and some of the explanatory variables, correlation
between these variables and the error term is a distinct possibility.
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matrix of correlations between the variables in X and the variables in W is of
maximum possible rank (=k). If property (ii) is met, then these instruments are said
to be fully correlated. The W array can include any variable from X that is not itself
correlated with the error term or other explanatory variables (i.e., intercept, time
dummies). To be fully correlated, W must include at least as many variables as are
in X so that j C k. Instead of multiplying (2) by X0, as would be done to solve with
OLS, it is multiplied by R0W0, where R is a j 9 k weighting matrix, such as a subset
of k from the j instrumental variables or a linear combination of these variables, with
the only restriction that R must have rank k. This gives:
R0W 0y ¼ R0W 0Xb þ R0W 0e ð3Þ
The idea of an instrumental variable (IV) estimator of b is to approximate R0W 0e
to zero and solve.
R0W 0y ¼ R0W 0X biv ð4Þ
for biv ¼ R0W 0X½ 1R0W 0y. Subtracting (3) from (4),
R0W 0X biv bð Þ ¼ R0W 0e ð5Þ
If R0W 0X=n converges in probability to a nonsingular matrix and R0W 0e=n !p 0,
then biv !p b. Thus, when OLS breaks down due to correlation in right-hand side
variables and the disturbances, IV obtains consistent estimates provided the right
instruments are utilized.
5 Results
As an introduction, Appendix A presents basic statistics of all relevant variables in
nominal, unadjusted values. Table 1 reports pairwise correlations between all
variables utilized in this work.
With the exception of risk for inflation, the pairwise correlation between the
share of corruption on GDP and the rest of the explanatory variables is negative,
implying that investment profile, GDP per capita, FDI inflows, total trade, imports,
and the price of coca have an inverse relationship with corruption. The negative
correlation between corruption and GDP per capita is the strongest (r = -0.841),
and the weakest negative correlation occurs with the share of FDI inflows on GDP
(r = –0.026). Excepting risk for inflation (r = ?0.108), the negative correlation
between the corruption indicator and the explanatory variables conforms to the
expectation reflected in this paper that a richer, reliable, stable, and growing Bolivia,
with a permissive market for coca leaves, and interested in attracting foreign
investment, should be less corrupt.
5.1 Unit root tests
Table 2 reports the results of nonstationarity tests for the share of corruption on
GDP, investment profile, risk for inflation, real GDP per capita, price of coca, share
of FDI on GDP, share of imports on GDP, and share of total trade on GDP using the
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augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF test), Dickey-Fuller GLS (DF-GLS test) and the
Phillips and Perron (PP test) tests. A constant is included but no time trend, as
recommended by Dickey et al. (1986).
According to the tests statistics reported by MacKinnon (1991) and Elliott
et al. (1996) nonstationarity cannot be rejected for the levels of all variables at
the 5 % significance level. In contrast, when the data are differenced,
nonstationarity can be rejected for all data series studied. This indicates that
all the data series are integrated of order one, or I(1). The three tests generally
reinforce each other’s findings, hence confirming that all data series are
integrated of order one.22
Table 2 Unit root tests























4 1.5908 -7.1400** -1.0166 -2.7876* 1.4892 -15.8144**
Price of Coca
(pCoca)














4 -0.3618 -8.5244** -2.1484 -11.1216** -0.9822 -21.4046**
** and * denote significance at the 5 and 10 % level, respectively
22 According to the DF-GLS test, the nonstationarity null hypothesis is rejected for risk for inflation in
levels at the 10 %. With the PP test, the null hypothesis for this variable and for the share of imports on
GDP in levels is rejected at both the 5 and 10 % levels. With the ADF test, both of these variables are
integrated of order one.
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5.2 Instrumental variable estimates23
Table 3 presents instrumental variable estimates for three sets of equations.
Each set contains two specifications: one for the whole period (January 1993–
December 2012) and another for the Neoliberal period (January 1993–
December 2001). In all cases, the dependent variable is the share of corruption
on GDP and all specifications include real GDP per capita as a control variable
since it is expected that, regardless of other factors, higher levels of income will
lead to lower levels of corruption.24 Additionally, all specifications include
price of coca to determine the effect of the coca market on the dependent
variable. Year dummies are included in the Neoliberal period specifications to
capture the change in corruption over time due to possible omitted variables.
For specifications covering the whole period, a dummy variable (Evo Dummy)
is added to test for the impact of the Morales’ administration on the dependent
variable (January 1993 to January 2006 = 0; February 2006 to December
2012 = 1). The selected instruments are one-period lagged values of all
explanatory variables.
The results show that, regardless of the specification, corruption levels are
negatively and significantly affected by real GDP per capita, demonstrating
that as Bolivia’s per capita income increases it becomes less corrupt.
Furthermore, the share of FDI on GDP has the expected negative sign, though
it is significant only when the whole period is considered. This finding
implies that as FDI increases (decreases) the level of corruption decreases
(increases). Formally, the size of the coefficient on this variable for the
period January 1993–December 2012 indicates that an increase (decrease) in
foreign investment inflows of 1 percent of GDP decreases (increases) the
share of corruption on GDP by approximately 0.07 %. The investment climate
hypothesis (H1) is then confirmed, at least when the whole period is
analyzed.
The effect of share of total trade on GDP, included to account for the degree to
which corruption is affected by the openness of the Bolivian economy, is unclear, as
its coefficient is positive and significant when analyzed with the control variable and
the price of coca leaves in the specification covering the whole period, but
insignificant for the Neoliberal period and when analyzed in conjunction with the
other explanatory variables of interest. The openness hypothesis (H3) then cannot be
confirmed.
23 The three set of regressions presented in this section were estimated with OLS and GLS in order to test
the robustness of the IV estimates. Additionally, the basic specification was changed in various ways (i.e.,
expressing dependent and independent variables in terms of population instead of GDP, not expressing
them in terms of other variables and simply utilizing nominal values) and in all cases the findings
resemble the IV estimates. The results with the alternative estimation methods and specifications are
available upon request.
24 Including GDP per capita as a control variable is based on the findings of several authors, ably
summarized in Svensson’s (2005) survey on corruption, which demonstrates that, at least at the micro
level, there is a well established inverse relation between levels of corruption and income for different
countries.
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The results found for coca are very revealing. In all three sets of equations,
when the whole period is taken into consideration, the coefficient for the price
of coca is negative and statistically significant, implying that higher prices of
coca leaves lead to lower levels of corruption in the country. Given the
consistent increases in production and price levels throughout the 2000s, this
finding reflects the current scenario of unsuccessful eradication policies which,
remarkably, may have resulted in less corruption, not more (Scenario D, Sect.
2). Tellingly, when the same exercise is done for the Neoliberal period
(January 1993–December 2001), the price of coca has a positive and
significant association with the dependent variable, implying that during this
period increases in the price of coca leaves actually increased corruption levels
in the country. This result is even more striking considering that during the
Neoliberal years successive government tried to take Bolivia, unsuccessfully,
out of the cocaine circuit by strict controls on the amount of coca plantations
(through Plan Dignidad). The implication of this finding, aside from the
obvious failure of eradication policies, is that those efforts increased the
chances for corrupt activities in the country, and probably explain, at least in
part, the current state of affairs in Bolivia. A second implication is that a less-
controlled, less-penalizing coca market may be more conducive to lower levels
of corruption in Bolivia, confirming the permissive coca market hypothesis
(H2). As the head of the ‘Cocaleros Union’—a post Evo Morales has not
renounced—the current head of state has explicitly allowed more legal coca
plantations and has implicitly ignored the growth of illegal ones.25 This laissez
faire attitude towards coca growers has brought the coca market to the surface,
and has, perhaps inadvertently, created a situation where the incentives and
opportunities for corruption—that would abound when the coca market was
heavily underground and regulated—have decreased substantially in the past
few years. Finally, and with regard to the impact of the Morales’ adminis-
tration on corruption levels in the country, the coefficient for the Evo Dummy
variable has a (expected) positive sign, but it is statistically insignificant,
implying that the impact of the current regime on the dependent variable is
indeterminate.
It is noteworthy that in all cases the impact of GDP per capita on the
dependent variable is several times more important than the share of FDI on
GDP and the price of coca leaves. Though this finding may seem curious, it is
interesting to note that it is not at all unusual since other authors (especially
Pinto and Zhu (2009), and Larraı´n and Tavares (2004), to some extent) have
also found similar results, highlighting the importance of increasing wealth as
the most important tool in reducing corruption. This observation also applies to
the high determination coefficients (R2s) found in the estimated regressions, as
25 See http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35751.htm for an appraisal by the US State Department on the
Evo Morales’ new policy on coca cultivation. Also, refer to the yearly World Drug Report from UNODC
for periodic reports on Bolivia’s efforts to eradicate illegal coca plantations.
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these estimates are also evident in other works (Pinto and Zhu (2009), for
instance).26
To test the robustness of the findings with the base specifications, the same set of
regressions was estimated utilizing two alternative control variables (investment
profile and risk for inflation) and an alternative trade openness indicator (the share
of imports on GDP). These findings are reported in Table 4.
As the findings in Table 4 illustrate, the basic pattern of results does not
change with alternative control and trade openness indicators. In all cases, the
investment climate hypothesis is confirmed—i.e., the coefficient for the share of
FDI on GDP is negative and significant—and the permissive coca market
hypothesis is confirmed as well, since the coefficient for the price of coca
leaves is negative and significant for the whole period and positive and
significant during the neoliberal period. The openness hypothesis, however,
cannot be confirmed as the coefficient estimates for this variable behave in
opposite direction to the base specifications reported in Table 3, hence
demonstrating inconsistency and lack of clarity on the actual impact of
alternative trade openness indicators on corruption.
One distinct difference between the estimates observed with the base
specifications (Table 3) and with the alternative control and trade openness
indicators (Table 4), however, refers to the impact of the Evo Morales
administration on the dependent variable. The findings with the alternative
indicators show, unequivocally, that Evo has had a significant, decreasing impact
on corruption, implying that since February 2006, when he assumed the
presidency of the country, corruption levels have actually decreased. While
interesting, this result should be taken with a grain of salt as the actual impact of
his administration will only be clear—and more accurately assessed—with time
(and more observations points).
6 Conclusions
This paper makes a first systematic attempt to estimate the effect of FDI and coca on
the level of corruption in Bolivia. It finds that FDI inflows and a more permissive
market for coca significantly deter corruption. The significance of the coca findings
suggests that a less-controlled, more flexible coca market is the principal avenue to
reducing corruption levels in the country. The findings also point to the need to
make Bolivia a more secure place for foreign investment. The impact of the
openness of the Bolivian economy was found to be indeterminate, as was the impact
of the Morales’ administration on corruption levels in the country.
This study attempts to quantify the importance of the coca market as a possible
source of corruption and suggests that efforts to curtail coca plantations are not the
way to tackle the problem of drugs or of corruption in Bolivia. It points out to the
need of a more pragmatic approach to the problem and the need to consider
26 High R2s values are expected in time-series analysis, so the results that have been obtained are not that
surprising either way.
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alternative solutions to an issue that only seems to get worse with greater public
intervention. A specific recommendation that would go far in demonstrating a more
pragmatic understanding of the coca problem in countries like Bolivia would be the
declassification of coca leaves as Schedule I drug under the Single Convention of
Narcotics Drugs Treaty.27 With this seemingly obvious—and rational—reform, the
innocuous derivatives of coca leaves, such as coca tea, would gain a step on their
harmful cousin, generating the conditions for a natural transition from cocaine to
less harmful coca derivatives. Given the abject failure of the so-called war on drugs
and the deep historical ties that Bolivia has with this leaf, it is difficult to understand
the lack of interest that exists with the international community in even considering
the amendment of a treaty that has proven to be futile in controlling either the
production or consumption of cocaine anywhere in the world.
Finally, and since corruption levels in Bolivia seem to decrease with less
government control on the market for coca leafs, perhaps outright, unilateral
formalization and legalization of all coca cultivations, regardless of their final
destination, may produce the desired outcome of less corruption and more
transparency in a country that certainly needs more accountability in every front.
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Appendix
See Table 5.
27 The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, by resolution 689J (XXVI) of July 28 1958,
decided to convene in accordance with Article 62, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the UN, and with the
provisions of General Assembly, resolution 366 (IV) of December 3, 1949, a plenipotentiary conference
for the adoption of a single convention on narcotics drugs to replace by a single instrument the then
existing multilateral treaties in the field. The Single Convention on Narcotics Drug Treaty is the result of
that conference and its conclusions still stand today.
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